We argue that deterministic market clearing formulations introduce arbitrary distortions between day-ahead and expected real-time prices that bias economic incentives and block diversification. We extend and analyze the stochastic clearing formulation proposed by Pritchard et al. (2010) in which the social surplus function induces penalties between day-ahead and real-time quantities. We prove that the formulation yields price distortions that are bounded by the bid prices, and we show that adding a similar penalty term to transmission flows and phase angles ensures boundedness throughout the network. We prove that when the price distortions are zero, day-ahead quantities converge to the quantile of real-time counterparts. The undesired effects of price distortions suggest that stochastic settings provide significant benefits over deterministic ones that go beyond social surplus improvements. We propose additional metrics to evaluate these benefits. . These studies have demonstrated significant improvements in reliability over deterministic formulations. However, these works do not explore pricing issues.
Introduction
Day-ahead markets enable commitment and pricing of resources to hedge against uncertainty in demand, generation, and network capacities that are observed in real time. The day-ahead market is cleared by independent system operators (ISOs) using deterministic unit commitment (UC) formulations that rely on expected capacity forecasts, while uncertainty is handled by allocating reserves that are used to balance the system if real-time capacities deviate from the forecasts. A large number of deterministic clearing formulations have been proposed in the literature. Representative examples include those of Carrión and Arroyo (2006) , Gribik et al. (2011) , and Hobbs Zavala, Kim, Anitescu, (2001) . Pricing issues arising in deterministic clearing formulations have been explored by Wang et al. (2012) , Galiana et al. (2003), and O'Neill et al. (2005) .
In addition to guaranteeing reliability and maximizing social surplus, several metrics are monitored by ISOs to ensure that the market operates efficiently. For instance, as is discussed in Ott (2003) , the ISO must ensure that market players receive economic incentives that promote participation (give participants the incentive to follow commitment and dispatch signals). It is also desired that day-ahead and real-time prices are sufficiently close or converge. One of the reasons is that price convergence is an indication that capacity forecasts are effective reflections of real-time capacities. Recent evidence provided by Bowden et al. (2009) , however, has shown that persistent and predictable deviations between day-ahead and real-time prices (premia) exist in certain markets. This can bias the incentives to a subset of players and block the entry of new players and technologies. The introduction of purely financial players was intended to eliminate premia, but recent evidence provided by Birge et al. (2013) shows that this has not been fully effective. One hypothesis is that virtual players can exploit predictable price differences in the day-ahead market to create artificial congestion and benefit from financial transmission rights (Joskow and Tirole 2000) .
Prices are also monitored by ISOs to ensure that they do not run into financial deficit (a situation called revenue inadequacy) when balancing payments to suppliers and from consumers. This is discussed in detail in Philpott and Pritchard (2004) . In addition, ISOs might need to use uplift payments and adjust prices to protect suppliers from operating at an economic loss. This is necessary to prevent players from leaving the market. As discussed by O'Neill et al. (2005) , Morales et al. (2012) , and Wang et al. (2012) ; uplift payments can result from using incomplete characterizations of the system in the clearing model. Such characterizations can arise, for instance, in the presence of nonconvexities and stochasticity.
Achieving efficient market operations under intermittent renewable generation is a challenge for the ISOs because uncertainty follows complex spatiotemporal patterns not faced before (Constantinescu et al. (2011) ). In addition, the power grid is relying more strongly on natural gas and transportation infrastructures, and it is thus necessary to quantify and mitigate uncertainty in more systematic ways (Liu et al. (2009) , Zavala (2014) ).
Previous Work
A wide range of stochastic formulations of day-ahead market clearing and operational UC procedures has been previously proposed. In operational UC models, on/off decisions are made in advance (here-and-now) to ensure that enough running capacity is available at future times to balance the system. The objective of these formulations is to ensure reliability and maximization of social its deterministic counterpart. In Section 5 we present the pricing properties of the formulation.
In Section 6 we present case studies to demonstrate the developments. Concluding remarks and directions of future work are provided in Section 7.
Market Setting
We consider a market setting based on the work of Pritchard et al. (2010) and Ott (2003) . A set of suppliers (generators) G and consumers (demands) D bid into the day-ahead market by providing price bids α g i ≥ 0, i ∈ G and α d j ≥ 0, j ∈ D, respectively. If a given demand is inelastic, we set the bid price to α d j = V OLL where V OLL denotes the value of lost load, typically 1,000 $/MWh. Suppliers and consumers also provide estimates of the available capacitiesḡ i andd j , respectively. Zavala, Kim, Anitescu, and Birge: Stochastic Market Clearing with Consistent Pricing Article submitted to Operations Research; manuscript no. 5 We assume that these capacities satisfy 0 ≤ḡ i ≤ Cap g i and 0 ≤d j ≤ Cap d j where 0 ≤ Cap g i < +∞ is the total installed capacity of the supplier (its maximum possible supply) and 0 ≤ Cap d i < +∞ is the total installed capacity of the consumer (its maximum possible demand). The cleared dayahead quantities for suppliers and consumers are given by g i and d j , respectively. These satisfy 0 ≤ g i ≤ḡ i and 0 ≤ d j ≤d j .
Suppliers and consumers are connected through a network comprising of a set of lines L and a set of nodes N . For each line ∈ L we define its sending node as snd( ) ∈ N and its receiving node as rec( ) ∈ N (we highlight that this definition of sending node is arbitrary because the flow can go in both directions). For each node n ∈ N , we define its set of receiving lines as L rec n ⊆ L and its set of sending lines as L snd n ⊆ L. These sets are given by
Day-ahead capacitiesf are also typically estimated for the transmission lines. We assume that these satisfy 0 ≤f ≤ Cap f . Here, 0 ≤ Cap f < +∞ is the installed capacity of line (its maximum possible value). The cleared day-ahead flows are given by f such that −f ≤ f ≤f . The flows f are determined by the line susceptance B and the phase angle difference between two nodes of the line. Day-ahead capacities θ n ,θ n are estimated for each node n ∈ N . The cleared day-ahead phase angles are given by θ n such that θ n ≤ θ n ≤θ n for n ∈ N . We define the set of all suppliers connected to node n ∈ N as G n ⊆ G and the set of demands connected to node n as D n ⊆ D. Subindex n(i)
indicates the node at which supplier i ∈ G is connected, and n(j) indicates the node at which the demand j ∈ D is connected. We use subindex i exclusively for suppliers and subindex j exclusively for consumers.
At the moment the day-ahead market is cleared, the real-time market conditions are uncertain.
In particular, we assume that a subset of generation, demand, and transmission line capacities are uncertain. We further assume that discrete distributions comprising a finite set of scenarios Ω and p(ω) denote the probability of scenario ω ∈ Ω. We also require that ω∈Ω p(ω) = 1. The expected
Moreover, the median is denoted as M[Y (ω)] = Q Y (ω) (0.5) and satisfies where | · | is the absolute value function.
In the real-time market, the suppliers can offer to sell additional generation over the agreed dayahead quantities at a bid price α g,+ i ≥ 0. The additional generation is given by
is the cleared quantity in the real-time market and 0 ≤Ḡ i (ω) ≤ Cap g i is the realized capacity under scenario ω ∈ Ω. Real-time generation quantities are bounded as 0 ≤ G i (ω) ≤Ḡ i (ω). Here, (X − x) + := max{X − x, 0}. The suppliers also have the option of buying electricity at an offering price α g,− i ≥ 0 to account for any uncovered generation (G i (ω) − g i ) − over the agreed day-ahead quantities. Here, (X − x) − = max{−(X − x), 0}.
Consumers provide bid prices α d,− j ≥ 0 to buy additional demand (D j (ω) − d j ) + in the real-time market, where D j (ω) is the cleared quantity and 0 ≤D j (ω) ≤ Cap d j is the available demand capacity realized under scenario ω ∈ Ω. We thus have 0 ≤ D j (ω) ≤D j (ω). Consumers also have the option of selling the demand deficit (D j 
The flows cleared in the real-time market are given by F (ω) and satisfy −F (ω) ≤ F (ω) ≤F (ω).
Here,F (ω) is the transmission line capacity realized under scenario ω ∈ Ω and satisfies −Cap f ≤ F (ω) ≤ Cap f . Uncertain line capacities can be used to model N − x contingencies or uncertainties in capacity due to ambient conditions (e.g., ambient temperature affects line capacity). The cleared phase angles in the real-time market are given by Θ n (ω) such that θ n ≤ Θ n (ω) ≤θ n for n ∈ N .
We also define day-ahead clearing prices (i.e., locational marginal prices) for each node n ∈ N as π n . The real-time prices are defined as Π n (ω), ω ∈ Ω.
Clearing Formulations
In this section, we present energy-only day-ahead deterministic and stochastic clearing formulations.
The term "energy-only" indicates that no unit commitment decisions are made. We consider these simplified formulations in order to focus on important concepts related to pricing and payments to suppliers and consumers. Model extensions are left as a topic of future research.
Deterministic Formulation
In a deterministic setting, the day-ahead market is cleared by solving the following optimization problem. 
The objective function of this problem is the day-ahead negative social surplus. The solution of this problem gives the day-ahead quantities g i , d j , flows f , phase angles θ n , and prices π n . The deterministic formulation assumes a given value for the capacitiesḡ i ,d j ,f , θ n , and θ n . Because the conditions of the real-time market are uncertain at the time the day-ahead problem (4) is solved, these capacities are typically assumed to be the most probable ones (e.g., the expected value or forecast for supply and demand capacities) or are set based on the current state of the system (e.g., for line capacities and phase angle ranges). In particular, it is usually assumed thatḡ
, andf is the most probable state. One can also assume thatḡ i = Cap g i andd j = Cap d j , andf = Cap f . Such an assumption, however, can yield high economic penalties if the day-ahead dispatched quantities are far from those realized in the real-time market. Similarly, one can also assume conservative capacities (e.g., worst-case). In this sense, the day-ahead capacitiesḡ i ,d j ,f can be used as mechanisms to hedge against risk, as experienced ISO operators do to allow for a safety margin. Doing so, however, gives only limited control because the players need to summarize the entire possible range of real-time capacities in one statistic. In Section 4 we argue that this limitation can induce a distortion between day-ahead and real-time prices and biases revenues.
When the capacities become known, the ISO uses fixed day-ahead committed quantities g i , d j , f , θ n , to solve the following real-time clearing problem. min D j (·),G i (·),F (·),Θn(·) i∈G
The objective function of this problem is the real-time negative social surplus. The solution of this problem yields different real-time quantities G i (ω), D j (ω), flows F (ω), phase angles Θ n (ω), and prices Π n (ω) depending on the scenario ω ∈ Ω realized. 
Stochastic Formulation
Motivated by the structure of the day-ahead and real-time market problems, we consider the stochastic market clearing formulation:
The stochastic setting provides a natural mechanism to anticipate the effects of day-ahead decisions on real-time market corrections. This property gives rise to several important pricing and payment properties, as we will see in the following section.
The above formulation is partially based on the one proposed by Pritchard et al. (2010) . We highlight the following features of the model:
• The real-time prices (duals of the network balance (6d)) have been weighted by their corresponding probabilities. This feature will enable us to construct the Lagrange function of the problem in terms of expectations.
• The network balance in the real-time market is written in terms of the residual quantities
, and flows (F (ω) − f ). This feature will be key in obtaining consistent prices and it emphasizes the fact that the real-time market is a market of corrections.
• We assume that the real-time quantity boundsḠ i (ω),D j (ω),F (ω) are independent of the day-ahead quantities. The differences between the proposed formulation and the one presented by Pritchard et al. (2010) are the following.
• The formulation does not impose bounds on the day-ahead quantities, flows and phase angles.
In Section 5 we will prove that the penalization terms render bounds for the day-ahead quantities, flows and phase angles redundant (see Theorem 7).
• The parameters ∆α f,+ , ∆α f,− , ∆α θ,+ , ∆α θ,− > 0 penalize deviations between day-ahead and real-time quantities. In Section 4 we will see that these penalties are motivated by the structure of the social surplus and in Section 5 we will show that they are key to ensure desirable pricing properties.
• We allow for randomness in the transmission line capacities. In Section 5 we will see that doing so has no effect on the underlying properties of the model.
• We assume that the stochastic problem has relative complete recourse. That is, there exist a feasible real-time recourse decision for any day-ahead decision.
We refer to the solution of the stochastic formulation (6) as the here-and-now solution to reflect the fact that a single implementable decision must be made now in anticipation of the uncertain future and that day-ahead quantities and flows are scenario-independent. We also consider the (ideal, non-implementable) wait-and-see (WS) solution. For details, refer to Birge and Louveaux (1997) . In the WS setting, we assume that the capacities for each scenario are actually known at the moment of decision. In other words, we assume availability of perfect information. In order to obtain the WS solution, the clearing problem (6) is solved by allowing first-stage decisions g i , d j , f to be scenario-dependent. It is not difficult to prove that in this case, each scenario generates day-ahead prices and quantities that are equal to real-time counterparts because no corrections are necessary. We denote the expected social surplus obtained under perfect information as ϕ sto W S .
ISO Performance Metrics for Market Clearing
In this section, we discuss some objectives of the ISOs from a market operations standpoint and use these to motivate a new set of metrics to quantify performance of deterministic and stochastic formulations. We place special emphasis on the structure of the social surplus function and on the issue of price consistency. We provide arguments as to why price consistency is a key property in achieving incentives. We argue that deterministic formulations do not actually yield price consistency and hence result in a range of undesired effects such as biased payments, revenue inadequacy, and the need for uplifts.
We highlight that we define different metrics based on market behavior in expectation. A practical way of interpreting these expected metrics is the following: assume that the market conditions of a given day are repeated over a sequence of days and we collect the results over such period by using each day as a scenario. We then compute a certain metric (like the social welfare) to perform the comparisons between the stochastic and deterministic clearing mechanisms to evaluate performance. In this sense, market behavior in expectation can also interpreted as long run market behavior.
Social Surplus
Consider the combination of the day-ahead and real-time costs for suppliers and consumers,
We define the incremental bid prices as ∆α g,
To avoid degeneracy, we require that the incremental bid prices are positive:
Theorem 1. Assume that the incremental bid prices are positive. The cost functions for suppliers and consumers can be expressed as
Proof Consider the cost function for suppliers
The last two equalities follow from the fact that
The same property applies to C d j (ω) (using the appropriate cost terms). We say that the incremental bid prices are symmetric if ∆α g,+ Corollary 1. If the incremental bid prices are symmetric, then the cost functions for suppliers and consumers can be expressed as
because of the fact that |X − x| = (X − x) + + (X − x) − . The same property applies to C d j (ω) (using the appropriate cost terms).
Definition 1 (Social Surplus). We define the expected negative social surplus (or social surplus for short) as
where ϕ g , ϕ d are the expected supply and consumer costs,
This particular structure of the expected social surplus function was noticed by Pritchard et al.
(2010) and provides interesting insights. From Equation (11), we note that the expected quan-
] act as forecasts of the day-ahead quantities and are priced by using the day-ahead bids α g i , α j d (first term). This immediately suggests that it is the expected cleared quantities G i (ω), D j (ω) and not the capacitiesḡ i ,d j that are to be used as forecasts, as is done in the day-ahead deterministic formulation (4). The second and third terms penalize deviations of the real-time quantities from the day-ahead commitments using the incremental bid prices.
More interestingly, Corollary 1 suggests that when the incremental bid prices are symmetric (i.e., ∆α g,+ i = ∆α g,− i and ∆α d,+ j = ∆α d,− j ), day-ahead quantities will tend to converge to the median of the real-time quantities if the expected social surplus function is minimized. A deterministic setting, however, cannot guarantee optimality in this sense because it minimizes the day-ahead and real-time components of the surplus function separately. In particular, the expected social surplus for the deterministic formulation is obtained by solving the day-ahead problem (4) followed by Article submitted to Operations Research; manuscript no. the solution of the real-time problem (5) for all scenarios ω ∈ Ω. The day-ahead surplus and the expected value of the real-time surplus are then combined to obtain the expected surplus ϕ. A deterministic setting can yield surplus inefficiencies because it cannot properly anticipate the effect of day-ahead decision on real-time market decisions. For instance, certain suppliers can be inflexible in the sense that they cannot modify their day-ahead supply easily in the real-time market (e.g., coal plants). This results in constraints of the form g i = G i (ω) or d j = D j (ω), ω ∈ Ω. This inflexibility can trigger inefficiencies because the operator is forced to use expensive units in the real-time market (e.g., combined-cycle) or because load shedding is needed to prevent infeasibilities.
Most studies on stochastic market clearing and unit commitment have focused on showing improvements in social surplus over deterministic formulations. In Section 6 we demonstrate that even when social surplus differences are negligible, the resulting prices and payments can be drastically different. This situation motivates us to consider alternative metrics for monitoring performance.
We note that the objective function of the stochastic clearing formulation (6) can be written as
where ϕ is the expected negative surplus function defined in (10). Consequently, if ∆α f,+ , ∆α f,− , ∆α θ,+ , ∆α θ,− are sufficiently small, we have that ϕ sto ≈ ϕ.
Pricing Consistency
We seek that the day-ahead prices be consistent representations of the expected real-time prices.
In other words, we seek that the expected price distortions (also known as expected price premia) π n − E[Π n (ω)], n ∈ N be zero or at least in a bounded neighborhood. This is desired for various reasons that we will explain.
Definition 2 (Price Distortions). We define the expected price distortion or expected price premia as
We say that the price is consistent at node n ∈ N if M π n = 0. In addition, we define the node average and maximum absolute distortions, 
13
Pricing consistency is related to the desire that day-ahead and real-time prices converge, as is discussed by Ott (2003) . Note, however, that it is unrealistic to expect that day-ahead and realtime prices converge in each scenario. This is possible only in the absence of uncertainty (capacity forecasts are perfect such as in the perfect information setting). Any real-time deviation in capacity from a day-ahead forecast will lead to a deviation between day-ahead and real-time prices. It is possible, however, to ensure that day-ahead and real-time prices converge in expectation. This situation also implies that any deviation of the real-time price from the day-ahead price is entirely the result of unpredictable random factors. This is also equivalent to saying that day-ahead prices converge to the expected value of the real-time prices.
Pricing consistency cannot be guaranteed with deterministic formulations because the day-ahead clearing model forecasts real-time capacities, not real-time quantities. Consequently, players are forced to "summarize" their possible real-time capacities in single statisticsd j ,ḡ i ,f . Expected values are typically used. This summarization, however, is inconsistent because it does not effectively average real-time market performance as the structure of the surplus function (11) suggests. In fact, as we show in Section 5, expected values need not be the right statistic to use in the day-ahead market. This is consistent with the observations made by Morales et al. (2014) . In addition, we note that certain random variables might be difficult to summarize (e.g., if they follow multimodal and heavy-tailed distributions). For instance, consider that there is uncertainty about the state of a transmission line in the real-time market (i.e., there is a probability that it will fail). In a deterministic setting it is difficult to come up with a "forecast" value for the day-ahead capacitȳ f in such a case.
Suppliers and Consumer Payments
As argued by Kaye et al. (1990) , we can justify the desire of seeking price consistency by analyzing the payments to the market players. The payment includes the day-ahead settlement plus the correction payment given at real-time prices, as is the standard practice in market operations. For more details, see Ott (2003) and Pritchard et al. (2010) .
Definition 3 (Payments). The payments to suppliers and from consumers in scenario ω ∈ Ω are defined as follows:
Article submitted to Operations Research; manuscript no.
We say that the expected payments are consistent if they satisfy
where
If the prices are consistent at each node n ∈ N , the expected payments are consistent. This definition of consistency is motivated by the following observations. The price distortion is factored in the expected payments. From (17) we see that price distortions (premia) can bias benefits toward a subset of players. In particular, if the premium at a given node is negative (M π n < 0), a supplier will not benefit from the day-ahead market but a consumer will. This situation can prevent suppliers from participating in day-ahead market. If M π n > 0, the oppostive holds true. This situation can prevent consumers from providing price-responsive demands. We can thus conclude that price consistency ensures payment consistency with respect to suppliers and consumers. In other words, M π n = 0 implies (16). Kaye et al. (1990) argue that setting the day-ahead prices to the expected real-time prices (price consistency) is desirable because it effectively eliminates the day-ahead component of the market.
Consequently, the market operates (in expectation) as a pure real-time market. This situation is desirable because it implies that the day-ahead market does not interfere with the incentives provided by real-time markets. This is particularly important for players that benefit from realtime market variability (such as peaking units and price-response demands). This also implies that the ISO does not give any preference to either risk-taking or risk-averse players. We also highlight that price consistency does not imply that premia do not exist; they can exist in each scenario but not in expectation.
Deterministic formulations can yield persistent price premia that benefit a subset of players or that can be used for market manipulation. For instance, consider the case in which a wind farm forecast has the same mean but very different variance (uncertainty) for several consecutive days.
If the expected forecast is used, the day-ahead prices will be consistently the same for all days, thus making them more predictable and biased toward a subset of players. While the use of riskadaptive reserves can help ameliorate this effect, this approach is not guaranteed to achieve price consistency.
Uplift Payments
From (17) we see that if the premium at a given node is negative (M π n < 0), negative payments (losses) can be incurred by the suppliers. This issue is analyzed by Wong and Fuller (2007) and Morales et al. (2012) . For instance, a wind supplier might be cleared at a given forecast capacity and at a low price but in real-time it might need to buy back power at a larger price if the realized capacity is lower than forecasted (this is illustrated in Section 6). It is thus desired that suppliers be paid at least as much as what they asked for and it is desired that consumers do not pay more than what they are willing to pay for. This is formally stated in the following definition.
Definition 4 (Wholeness). We say that suppliers and consumers are whole in expectation if
If the players are not made whole, they can leave the market and this can hinder diversification.
Uplift payments are routinely used by the ISOs to avoid this situation (Galiana et al. 2003 , Baldick et al. 2005 . Uplifts can result from inadequate representations of system behavior such as nonconvexities or, as we will see in Section 6, can result from using inadequate statistical representations of real-time market performance in deterministic settings. Consequently, uplift payments are a useful metric to determine the effectiveness of a given clearing formulation.
Definition 5 (Uplift Payments). We define the expected uplift payments to suppliers and consumers as
We also define the total uplift as
We highlight that our setting is convex and we thus only consider uplifts arising from inadequate statistical representations.
Revenue Adequacy
An efficient clearing procedure must ensure that the ISO does not run into financial deficit. In other words, the ISO must have a positive cash flow (payments collected from consumers are greater than the payments given to suppliers). We consider the following expected revenue definition, used by Pritchard et al. (2010) , to assess performance with respect to this case.
Definition 6 (Revenue Adequacy). The expected net payment to the ISO is defined as
We say that the ISO is revenue adequate in expectation if M ISO ≤ 0.
Revenue adequacy guarantees that, in expectation, the ISO will not run into financial deficit.
Properties of Stochastic Clearing
In this section, we prove that the stochastic clearing formulation yields bounded price distortions and that these distortions can be made arbitrarily small. In addition, we prove that day-ahead quantities are bounded by real-time quantities and that they converge to a quantile of the real-time quantities when the distortions are zero. Further, we prove that the formulation yields revenue adequacy and zero uplifts in expectation.
No Network Constraints
We begin our discussion with a single-node formulation (no network constraints) and then generalize the results to the case of network constraints. The single-node formulation has the form:
This formulation assumes infinite transmission capacity. In this case, the entire network collapses into a single node; consequently, a single day-ahead price π and real-time price Π(ω) are used.
We state that the partial Lagrange function of (21) is given by
The contribution of the balance constraints can be written in expected value form if we weight the Lagrange multipliers of the balance equations (prices) by the probabilities p(ω).
Theorem 2. Consider the single-node stochastic clearing problem (21), and assume that the incremental bid prices are positive. The price distortion M π = π − E[Π(ω)] is bounded as
and
, we have the partial Lagrange function
The stationarity conditions of the partial Lagrange function with respect to the day-ahead quantities d j , g i are given by
Rearranging (24a), we obtain
From the property
we have
Since
From (25) and (28), we have
The above relationships are equivalent to We now prove that the day-ahead quantities d j , g i obtained from the stochastic clearing model are implicitly bounded by the minimum and maximum real-time quantities. 
Proof Consider the following two cases:
• Case 1: The price distortion hits the lower bound for demand j; we thus have π (25a), and hence P(D j (ω) > d j ) = 0 and P(D j (ω) ≤ d j ) = 1 from (26). This implies that d j ≥ D j (ω), ∀ω ∈ Ω and d j ≥ min ω∈Ω D j (ω).
• Case 2: The price distortion hits the upper bound for demand j; we thus have π (25a), and hence P(D j (ω) ≥ d j ) = 1 from (26). This implies that d j ≤ D j (ω), ∀ω ∈ Ω and d j ≤ max ω∈Ω D j (ω).
We thus conclude that d j is bounded from below by min ω∈Ω D j (ω) and from above by max ω∈Ω D j (ω). The same procedure can be followed to prove that g i is bounded from below by min ω∈Ω G i (ω) and from above by max ω∈Ω G i (ω).
The implicit bound on the day-ahead quantities d j , g i is a key property of the stochastic model proposed because it implies that we do not have to choose day-ahead capacitiesḡ i ,d j (e.g., summarization statistics). These are automatically set by the model through the scenario information. This is important because, as we have mentioned, obtaining proper summarizing statistics for complex probability distributions might not be trivial.
We now prove that if the price distortion is zero, the day-ahead quantities converge to quantiles of the real-time quantities.
Theorem 4. Consider the stochastic clearing problem (21), and assume that the incremental bid prices are positive. If the price distortion is zero at the solution, then
Proof From (27) only be guaranteed when the quantile and mean coincide. These observations thus imply that the expected value is not necessarily the only statistic that can be used for the capacities in the day-ahead market.
We now prove that the stochastic formulation yields zero uplifts in expectation. Revenue adequacy is not considered because this is a single-node problem. We use the strategy followed by Morales et al. (2012) . For this discussion, we denote a minimizer of the partial Lagrange function (subject to the constraints (21d) and (21e)) as d * j , D j (·) * , g * i , G i (·) * , π * , Π * (·). Because the problem is convex, we know that the optimal prices π * , Π * (·) satisfy
Moreover, at fixed π * , Π * (·), the partial Lagrange function can be separated as
Consequently, one can minimize the partial Lagrange function by minimizing (34) independently.
Theorem 5. Consider the single-node clearing problem (21), and let the assumptions of Theorem 2 hold. Any minimizer d * j , D j (·) * , g * i , G i (·) * , π * , Π * (·) of (21) yields zero uplift payments in expectation:
Proof From Definition 5, it suffices to show that E
For fixed π * , Π * (ω), the candidate solution d j = D j (·) = g i = G i (·) = 0 is feasible for (32) with values L g i (g i , G i (·), π * , Π * (·)) = 0, i ∈ G and L d (d j , D j (·), π * , Π * (·)) = 0, j ∈ D. Because the candidate is suboptimal we have L g i (g * i , G * i (·), π * , Π * (·)) ≤ L g i (g i , G i (·), π * , Π * (·)) = 0 and L d j (d * j , D * j (·), π * , Π * (·)) ≤ 0. The result follows from equations (34) and the definition of M U i and M U j in (19).
Network Constraints
Having established some insights into the properties of the stochastic model, we now turn our attention to the full stochastic problem with network constraints (6) and generalize our results.
It is well known that stochastic formulations yield a better expected social surplus. This follows from the well-known inequality (see Birge and Louveaux (1997) ):
This follows from the fact that the stochastic formulation will lead to a lower recourse cost (real-time penalty costs) than will the deterministic solution because the deterministic day-ahead problem does not anticipate recourse actions. The wait-and-see setting can perfectly anticipate real-time market conditions and therefore its real-time penalties are zero. This makes it the optimal, but nonimplementable policy.
We now establish boundedness of the price distortions throughout the network. To establish our result, we need the following definitions. We rewrite equations (6c) and (6e) as
otherwise.
We note that the above definitions imply that B ,rec( ) = B and B ,snd( ) = −B . Moreover we have that,
Using similar observations we have that,
Substituting the flows f , F (ω) by their corresponding phase angle expressions and using the above properties we have that the stochastic clearing problem (37) can be written as Zavala, Kim, Anitescu, 
We consider the partial Lagrange function of (39) as 
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We define the subsetN ⊆ N containing all nodes at which at least one supplier or consumer is connected. We also define the subset L n := L rec n ∪ L snd n .
Theorem 6. Consider the stochastic clearing model (39) and assume that the incremental bid prices are positive and that ∆α f,+ , ∆α f,− , ∆α θ,+ n , ∆α θ,− n > 0, ∈ L, n ∈ N . The price distortions M π n , n ∈ N are bounded as Proof The stationarity conditions of the partial Lagrange function with respect to the dayahead quantities g i , d j and phase angles θ n are given by
where we recall that n(i) is the node at which supplier i is connected and n(j) is the node at which demand j is connected. Following the same bounding procedure used in the proof of Theorem 2, we obtain
Rearranging (41c), we obtain
and therefore, from (42) and (44),
Hence, we have ∆α + n ≤ M π n ≤ ∆α − n . Because ∆ᾱ + n and ∆ᾱ − n are the smallest incremental bid prices at node n ∈N , we obtain the bound −∆ᾱ + n ≤ M π n ≤ ∆ᾱ − n , n ∈N . The price distortion is bounded for every node ∈ N . Moreover, if the penalty parameters ∆α f,+ , ∆α f,− , ∆α θ,+ n , ∆α θ,− n are made arbitrarily small, then the price distortion at every node becomes arbitrarily small. We now state results that are natural extensions of Theorems 3 and 4. 
Proof For the suppliers and demands, we can use the same procedure used in the proof of Theorem 3. The bounds on the day-ahead flows and phase angles follow the same argument as well. We use the definition (43) for simplicity. Consider the following two cases:
• Case 1: The price distortion hits the lower bound for node n; we thus have M π n = −∆α + n . This implies that − ∈Ln ∆α f,+ + ∆α f,− − ∆α θ,+ n − ∆α θ,− n ∈ S n from (42), and hence we have
From (26), equation (46a) implies that P (Θ n (ω) ≥ θ n ) = 1, and equation (46b) implies that
• Case 2: The price distortion hits the upper bound for node n; we thus have M π n = ∆α − n . This implies 0 ∈ S n from (42), and hence we have
From (26), equation (47a) implies that P (Θ n (ω) ≤ θ n ) = 1, and equation (46b) implies that P( n∈N B n Θ n (ω) ≤ n∈N B n θ n ) = P(F (ω) ≤ f ) = 1 for ∈ L n . Therefore, we have θ n ≥ Θ n (ω), ω ∈ Ω and θ n ≥ min ω∈Ω Θ n (ω). Similarly, f ≥ F (ω), ∀ω ∈ Ω and f ≥ min ω∈Ω F (ω) for ∈ L n .
Theorem 8. Consider the stochastic clearing problem (39), and let the assumptions of Theorem 6 hold. If the price distortions M π n , n ∈ N are zero at the solution, then
Proof For (48a) and (48b), we can use the same procedure used in the proof of Theorem 4.
Corollary 3. If the incremental bid prices are symmetric from Corollary 1, then d j = M (D j (ω)) , j ∈ D, and g i = M (G i (ω)) , i ∈ G.
We treat the penalty terms purely as a means to constrain the day-ahead flows and phase angles and induce the desired pricing properties. Our results indicate that this can be done with no harm by allowing ∆α f,+ , ∆α f,− , ∆α θ,+ n , ∆α θ,− n to be sufficiently small. Moreover, making these arbitrarily small guarantees that the expected social surplus of the stochastic problem (12) satisfies ϕ sto ≈ ϕ.
The alternative is to simply impose day-ahead bounds of the forms (4d) and (4g) and to eliminate the penalty terms on the flows and phase angles. In this case, however, we cannot guarantee that the price distortions are bounded, as we illustrate in the next section. In addition, similar to the case of day-ahead quantities, imposing day-ahead bounds on flows would require us to choose a proper statistic for the bounds of flows and phase angles, which might not be trivial to do.
We now prove revenue adequacy and zero uplift payments in expectation for the networkconstrained formulation. We denote a minimizer of the partial Lagrange function (40) (subject to the constraints (6f)-(6h)) as d * j , D * j (·), g * i , G * i (·), θ * n , Θ * n (·), π * n , Π * n (·). Because the problem is convex, we know that the prices π * n , Π * n (·) satisfy (d * j , D j (·) * , g * i , G * i (·), θ * n , Θ * n (·)) = argmin d j ,D j (·),g i ,G i (·),θn,Θn(·) L(d j , D j (·), g i , G i (·), θ n , Θ n (·), π * n , Π * n (·)) s.t. (6f) − (6h).
Moreover, at π * n , Π * n (·), the partial Lagrange function can be separated as L(d j , D j (·), g i , G i (·), θ n , Θ n (·), π * n , Π * n (·)) = i∈G L g i (g i , G i (·), π * n , Π * n (·)) + j∈D L d j (d j , D j (·), π * n , Π * n (·)) + L θ (θ n , Θ n (·), π * n , Π * n (·)).
where the first two terms are defined in (34) and 
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Consequently, one can minimize the partial Lagrange function by minimizing (34) and (50) independently.
Theorem 9. Consider the stochastic clearing problem (39), and let the assumptions of Theorem 6 hold. Any minimizer d * j , D j (·) * , g * i , G i (·) * , θ * n , Θ * n , π * n , Π * n (·) of (39) yields zero uplift payments for all players and revenue adequacy in expectation:
Proof For fixed π * n , Π * n (·), by the separation of the partial Lagrange function, the zero uplift payments directly result from Theorem 5. At fixed π * n , Π * n (·) we also note that θ n = Θ n (·) = 0 is a feasible candidate solution for the maximization of L θ (θ n , Θ n (·), π * n , Π * n (·)) and that, at this suboptimal point, this term is also zero.
If the flow balances (6b) and (6d) hold, we have
.
Consequently, for any arbitrary set of prices π n , Π n (·), we have 
Therefore, we have
where the second inequality holds because
We highlight that the introduction of the penalty terms for flows does not affect revenue adequacy and cost recovery because the partial Lagrange function remains separable for fixed prices.
Computational Studies
In this section, we illustrate the different properties of the stochastic model. We also demonstrate that the stochastic model outperforms the deterministic one in all the metrics proposed. We also seek to highlight stochastic formulations provide benefits that go beyond improvements in social surplus. The optimization problems considered in this section were solved using CPLEX-12.6.1.
All models can be accessed at http://zavalab.engr.wisc.edu/data.
System I
We first consider System I sketched in Figure 1 . The system has two deterministic suppliers on nodes 1 and 3 and a stochastic supplier on node 2. The stochastic supplier has three possible capacity scenarios G 2 (ω) = {25, 50, 75} MWh of equal probabilities p(ω) = {1/3, 1/3, 1/3}. For The line capacities have been designed such that the system becomes stressed in the scenario in which the stochastic supplier delivers only 25 MWh. We assume that the line susceptances are 50 for both lines. In this scenario, both transmission lines become congested, and real-time prices will reach high values. We use the penalty parameter ∆α θ n = 0.001. We compare the performance of the deterministic, stochastic here-and-now, and the stochastic wait-and-see (WS) settings. The results are presented in Table 1 . We compare the expected surplus for the suppliers ϕ g as well as prices and quantities. Because the demand is deterministic, the surplus for the consumers ϕ load is a constant. Consequently, we show only ϕ g . For the deterministic setting, the expected supply surplus ϕ g is $835, and the day-ahead prices π n are {10,20,20} $/MWh. The price distortion metrics M π avg , M π max are both zero. The stochastic WS (wait-and-see) solution is consistent in that it leads to no corrections of quantities in the real-time market and it yields the same day-ahead and real-time prices. Thus, we can guarantee convergence of day-ahead and realtime prices for each scenario only in the presence of perfect information. We note that the expected Article submitted to Operations Research; manuscript no. Table 1 System I. Comparison of quantities, prices, and social surplus. surplus as well as the day-ahead and real-time quantities for the stochastic and deterministic formulations are the same. The reason is that the the deterministic and stochastic formulations have the same primal solution. This situation might lead the practitioner to believe that no benefits are obtained from the stochastic formulation. The prices obtained, however, are completely different.
Hence one can see that arguments based on social surplus do not fully capture the benefits of stochastic formulations.
The different prices obtained with both formulations lead to drastically different payment distributions among the market participants. As seen in Table 2 , for the deterministic setting the suppliers obtain expected payments E[P g i (ω)] of ${250,-7219,569}. The wind supplier receives negative payments, and requires an uplift to enable cost recovery. In this case, the expected cost E[C g i (ω)] for the wind supplier is $52 and thus requires an expected uplift M U i of $7,271. For the stochastic formulation, the expected payments are ${250,7321,7295}. The wind supplier has positive payments and no uplift is required. This situation illustrates that the stochastic setting allocates resources efficiently. Note that all formulations are revenue adequate in expectation.
Remark 1. The optimization problems for System I are highly degenerate, and thus multiple dual solutions (i.e., prices in our context) are available. We highlight that the solutions reported in this section were obtained from the barrier method (without crossover) implemented in CPLEX-12.6.1, which would provide central point solutions. However, we also report the solutions obtained from different linear programming algorithms in Appendix. respectively. This suggests that the day-ahead bounds bias the statistics.
Effect of Incremental Bid Prices
We experiment the effect that the incremental bid prices have on the price distortion. Consider the case in which the demand in the central node is also stochastic and with scenarios D(ω) = {100, 50, 25}. We set the incremental bid price for the stochastic supplier ∆α g 2 to 1.0. For the demand incremental bid prices ∆α d = 0.001, 0.01, 0.1, and 1.0, the maximum price distortions M π max are 0.001, 0.010, 0.069, and 0.334, respectively. The distortion remains bounded by the incremental bid and can be made arbitrarily small as we decrease the incremental bid. The result is consistent with the properties established.
System II
We now consider the more complex system presented in Figure 2 . This is an adapted version of the system presented in Pritchard et al. (2010) . The system has two stochastic suppliers in nodes 2 and 4, three deterministic suppliers in nodes 1, 3, and 5 and one stochastic demand in node 6.
The demand is treated as inelastic. The demand follows a normal distribution with mean 250 and standard deviation 50. We use sample average approximation for solving this model and generate 25 scenarios of the demand with equal probabilities. The stochastic suppliers can have 5 possible capacities {10, 20, 60, 70, 90} MW. Each scenario represents one of the 25 different permutations from all possible capacities. The bid prices α g i for the suppliers are {100, 1, 100, 1, 200} $/MWh, and the incremental bid prices ∆α g i are {10, 0.1, 10, 0.1, 20}. We set α d = V OLL = 1000 $/MWh and ∆α d = 0.001. We also set the penalty parameters ∆α f = ∆α θ n = 0.001. We assume that all the line susceptances are 50.
Figure 2
Scheme of System II. Tables 3 and   4 . We first note that the price distortion for the deterministic setting is large, reaching values as large as 158 $/MWh. Also note that the distortion (premia) is small and positive in nodes 1 and 6 and large and negative in the other nodes. This is inefficient because it biases incentives towards a subset of players. The system is overly optimistic about performance in the real-time market where multiple scenarios exhibit transmission congestion, but the deterministic setting cannot foresee this. The stochastic formulation has almost the same expected social surplus as the deterministic formulation, but the price distortion is eliminated.
In Table 4 we see that payments for both formulations are similar except for the 4th supplier, which is a stochastic supplier. This supplier receives a negative payment and requires uplift under deterministic clearing. The uplift is eliminated by using the stochastic formulation. The expected payments collected with the stochastic here-and-now solution are close to those of the perfect information solution. 33, 627, −1398 , 24927} {8529, 0, 627, 20, 9640} -129111 Stochastic {8529, 33, 627, 1903 , 27985} {8529, 0, 627, 20, 9640} -116885 Stochastic-WS {8458, 37, 570, 1694 Table 5 we present the day-ahead quantities g i convergent to a quantile of the real-time quantities. The dayahead quantities g i with the quartiles (i.e., quantiles at p = 0.25, 0.5, 0.75) of the real-time quantities are compared with the means E[G i (ω)] of the real-time quantities. Recall that Q G i (ω) (0.5) = M[G i (ω)]. We use asymmetric incremental bid prices ∆α g,+ i , ∆α g,− i as set in Table 5 . As can be seen, convergence is achieved for all suppliers.
Reliability Constraints
We now consider the case in which there are random line failures. We consider 25 scenarios and assume that each one of the lines 1 → 2, 2 → 6, 3 → 6, 4 → 6, and 2 → 3 fails in at least five scenarios. All scenarios have equal probability. The results are presented in Table 6 . The deterministic setting becomes revenue inadequate in this case, whereas the stochastic setting is revenue adequate and achieves an expected ISO revenue that is close to that of the perfect information setting. An average price distortion of 1,374 $/MWh and a maximum distortion of 2,355 $/MWh were obtained for the deterministic setting, indicating a pronounced effect of line failures on prices. In particular, we observed that several demands need to be curtailed in the deterministic case. The stochastic formulation eliminates the distortion and the need for uplift payments. Note also that the fourth wind supplier again faces a negative revenue under deterministic clearing and an uplift payment is needed. This again illustrates that deterministic clearing can affect resource diversification because it consistently biases the payments towards a subset of players.
Article submitted to Operations Research; manuscript no. We now demonstrate the properties of the stochastic setting in a more complex network. The IEEE-118 system comprises 118 nodes, 186 lines, 91 demand nodes, and 54 suppliers. We assume that three stochastic suppliers are located at buses 10, 65 and 112, and that each supplier has an installed capacity of 300 MWh. This represents 14% of the total generation capacity. We also assume that a generation level for a given stochastic supplier follows a normal distribution with mean 300 MWh and standard deviation 150 MWh. The total generation capacity is 7,280 MW, and the total load capacity is 3,733 MW. We use sample average approximation and generate 25 scenarios for the stochastic suppliers. We use 10% of the generation cost for the incremental bid prices ∆α g i . The demands are assumed to be deterministic, and we set ∆α d j = 0.001. We use the penalty parameters ∆α f = ∆α θ n = 0.001. The results are presented in Table 7 . The uplift payment and The price distortions exist for the deterministic setting. The stochastic formulation reduces the uplift payments by a factor of 4 and eliminates the price distortion (M π max = 0.003). The difference in social surplus between deterministic and stochastic formulations is marginal. Also note that the penalty parameters for the flows and phase angles can be set to arbitrarily small values because they have no economic interpretation. Consequently, they do not affect the social surplus significantly.
Conclusions and Future Work
We have demonstrated that deterministic market clearing formulations introduce strong and arbitrary distortions between day-ahead and expected real-time prices that bias incentives and block diversification. We present a stochastic formulation capable of eliminating these issues. The formulation is based on a social surplus function that accounts for expected costs and penalizes deviations between day-ahead and real-time quantities. We show that the formulation yields day-ahead prices that are close to expected real-time prices. In addition, we show that day-ahead quantities converge to the quantile of real-time counterparts.
Future work requires extending the model in multiple directions. First, it is necessary to capture the progressive resolution of uncertainty by using multi-stage models and to incorporate ramping constraints and unit commitment decisions. Second, it is necessary to construct formulations that design day-ahead decisions that approach ideal wait-and-see behavior. Morales et al. (2014) demonstrate that this might be possible to do by using bi-level formulations, but a more detailed analysis is needed. Third, the proposed stochastic model is computationally more challenging than existing models available in the literature because it incorporates the detailed network in the first-stage.
This leads to problems that much larger first-stage dimensions which are difficult to decompose and parallelize. Consequently, scalable strategies are needed. Finally, it is necessary to explore implementation issues of stochastic markets such as effects of distributional errors.
Appendix. System I Solutions from Different LP Algorithms
Since System I problem is degenerate, multiple dual solutions are available. We report the solutions of System I obtained from different LP algorithms. Tables 8 and 9 present the solutions from primal simplex method and dual simplex method, respectively, from using CPLEX-12.6.1. Note that we present the dual solutions (i.e., prices) only, since all the primal solutions (i.e., day-ahead and real-time quantities) are identical. We also note that in all cases we have price converges. The deterministic settings result in the positive price distortions.
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